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All a world can do 
is appear 
 —Joseph Massey1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
If you were to ask a room of educated sorts what constitutes philosophical knowledge, you would 
expect serious disagreement about what the answer should be but little as to what the question 
itself was asking. Ask, however, what constitutes literary knowledge and considerable confusion as 
to what you mean is likely to arise. ‘Philosophical knowledge’, one assumes, indicates the form of 
insight into the world and human predicament philosophy attempts to produce. And while no 
two philosophers will offer the same account of the nature of this insight, most will hear the 
phrase as meaning, minimally, something like ‘philosophy’s presumed contributions to human 
understanding.’2 The phrase ‘literary knowledge,’ however, is likely to ring odd in many ears. It 
is, at the very least, ambiguous. To the literal-minded, ‘literary knowledge’ will not be taken to 
refer to a kind of insight at all, except for the kind literature trivially gives us: the knowledge of 
literature that comes from reading lots of poems, novels, and plays. To the more charitable-
minded, however, the phrase might be taken to indicate the possibility that we can speak of 
literary knowledge in the same register as we speak of philosophical or, for that matter, 
psychological, historical, or geographical knowledge. That is, it might be taken to claim for our 
various practices of literary production that they can yield, collectively if not always individually, 
a ‘form of knowing’: that there exists distinctly literary ways of making sense of the world and 
                                                        
1 Massey (2015), 4. 
2 ‘Presumed’ because one can be skeptical about philosophy’s actual contribution.    
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thus of presenting it as an object of understanding.3 It is this fuller and more cognitively 
ambitious sense of ‘literary knowledge’ that I explore here.4  
Hamlet is surely not the only literary work that obliges us to think seriously about the idea 
of literary knowledge, but it does provide a site for doing so that approximates ideal. This is not 
because, or just because, the history of Hamlet criticism has made of the work a veritable 
philosophical giving tree, finding in it everything from a critique of modern subjectivity to a 
proto-existentialist statement of the general blahness of being.5 Nor is it because, or just because, 
the problems Hamlet presents to the critic embody nearly perfectly the great philosophical 
problem of literature itself, namely the problem of meaning: the sheer expanse of interpretive 
possibilities a complex literary work generates and the challenge of understanding how we can 
legitimately adjudicate amongst them. All these features of Hamlet and its reception matter, but 
they have come to matter because at its core Hamlet seems possessed of a secret. And it is this 
secret, whatever it precisely may be, that calls on us to make meaningful a play that very well 
might be about, if not quite nothing, then nothingness. Philosophers and philosophically-minded 
critics return to Hamlet with such frequency because unraveling this secret promises to make sense 
not only of the text but also, in some manner, of ourselves. We may be disappointed when we 
come to learn its secret—secrets, like promises, can be empty—but the work nonetheless seems to 
know something and to prompt in the reader or spectator an urge to share in its knowledge. 
Understanding why we find that Hamlet personifies so powerfully the oppressiveness of existence, 
the destructive powers of thought, the limits of agency, the allure of the slacker—deciding which, 
exactly, is where the problem lies—goes some way in understanding how literature of any sort 
can seem to possess philosophical secrets.  
On the reading I shall offer here, Hamlet engages the problem of literary knowledge on 
two fronts. In the most direct respect, Hamlet apparently produces content that is of philosophical 
significance: the drama of the play is in part a drama of ideas, and those ideas seem to speak 
directly to standing philosophical concerns regarding, by my reckoning, the nature of the self and 
self-knowledge. But the particular manner in which Hamlet reveals its content—its mode of 
presentation, as it were—raises questions about the nature of literary meaning itself, including 
                                                        
3 Many readers will find it bewildering that one might sincerely ask whether literature can ‘make sense of the world’ 
(of course it can, surely in some manner). But if it bewilders, in academic philosophy, even in academic philosophy 
of literature, it is still a live question. Given our common ways of understanding the fictionality of imaginative 
literature, the nature of literary language, and the aesthetic and artistic concerns of art, it turns out to be 
remarkably difficult to explain in a theoretically satisfying manner how art engages with life. See Bruns (2006), 
Gaut (2007), Gibson (2007), Eldridge (2008), Felski (2008) Gaskin (2012), Mousley (2013), Lamarque (2014), and 
Harrison (2015) for discussion of this issue from various philosophical and disciplinary vantage-points.  
4 Readers familiar with contemporary analytic aesthetics will hear in my description of literary knowledge the 
general problem of ‘aesthetic cognitivism,’ that is, the debate on whether works of art bear distinct forms of 
cognitive value (and whether they derive their value in part from the forms of understanding they presumably 
articulate). For a survey of contemporary work in this debate, see Gibson (2008).  
5 Many of these critics were of course philosophers. A very incomplete list of philosophers who have had something 
to say about Hamlet includes Kant, Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Benjamin, 
Arendt, Foucault, and Stanley Cavell. For discussion of the philosophical reception of Hamlet, see Critchley and 
Jameison (2013) and Cutrofello (2014). 
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the meaning of the very content that gives Hamlet a claim to philosophical significance. The 
questions it raises are not skeptical and they do not lead us to cynicism regarding all talk of 
literary meaning and the general idea that a work of fiction can be about something.6 But they do 
require that we think very carefully about how the ‘words, words, words’ (II.ii.189)7 that 
constitute the work deliver meaning and so yield an object of understanding. If we take seriously 
Hamlet’s particular way with meaning, it will bring into relief a striking possibility for giving sense 
to the idea of literary knowledge.  
 
II. A Kind of Life   
Before beginning I need to say a few brief and general words about methodology. If Hamlet is in 
part a drama of ideas, what should we expect these ‘ideas’ to look like in their proper literary and 
dramatic context? What should we take ourselves to be looking for in Hamlet, or in any work of 
literature for that matter, if we hope to find something that can act as an object of ‘worldly’ 
knowledge (leaving it open, for the moment, as to what constitutes such a thing)? In a very 
general sense, how does something of cognitive significance appear in a fictional narrative? 
The approach I favor regards literature as apt to produce a form of narrative 
understanding. To claim that literature at times generates a distinctly narrative variety of 
understanding is to assert that a literary narrative alone can suffice to produce a kind of insight, 
indeed that the narrative a literary work weaves is the object of understanding, when such there 
is. If this sounds entirely obvious, be assured that contemporary philosophers of literature have 
produced many arguments to the contrary. And they have done so by arguing that we need 
something in addition to a fictional narrative if literature is to lead the mind to genuine insight. 
The most common way of explaining what this additional thing might be is to invoke the image 
of something declarative and sentence-like, say a proposition, a claim, an assertion, or a kind of 
conclusion. The idea is that it is only once we have an entity such as a proposition that a work of 
fiction can be said to produce a proper object of cognitive attention: an item that embodies, or 
otherwise acts as the vehicle of, insight. We see such an approach, for example, when we attempt 
to model literature’s cognitive value on thought experiments (hypothetical employments of thought 
that lead readers to embrace or dismiss a claim) or enthymemes (incomplete arguments the missing 
links of which readers are obliged to fill in).8 I will not argue against the idea that literature can 
do such things, but something always feels bad-mannered about such a philosophicalization of 
our sense of how literature traffics in ideas. When literature offers gifts cognitive and epistemic in 
nature, we should expect it to deliver them in distinctly literary packaging, and my interest in 
                                                        
6 In setting up my discussion this way I make it clear that I approach Hamlet as a literary narrative, as a text, and not 
as a play, or even as a poem. It is by emphasizing the narrative dimension that I am best able to stage my general 
philosophical point.   
7 Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the Arden III edition of Hamlet (2014), which uses Q2 as its primarily 
source.  
8 See Mikkonen (2014) for an exhaustive survey of these and other such strategies, as well as for a sophisticated 
defense of the idea that literary narratives can function as enthymemes. 
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defending a notion of narrative understanding is motivated in part by a desire to take this 
seriously. It may be the case that narrative understanding is expressible in propositional form, or, 
more generally, that literary narratives can assert truth-valued claims about extra-fictional reality, 
construct sound arguments, establish theses, perhaps even traffic in justified true belief itself. My 
claim is simply that a viable account of literary knowledge does not require any of this, and I trust 
that my discussion of Hamlet will make this clear. 
Note that what we explicitly find presented in a literary narrative is, among other things,  a 
(linguistically mediated) picture of human comportment and relationship: of actions, events, 
happenings, sufferings, and sayings. These things are organized such that certain patterns of 
significance are made visible and hence critically salient. We find much more than this, needless 
to say; but the point I wish to make is that in the first instance we should attempt to find in this 
‘weave of life,’ to use Wittgenstein’s phrase,9 the raw material of literary knowledge and the 
primary form in which it is declared to the mind. When Wittgenstein speaks of the importance of 
coming to grasp ‘special patterns in the weave of our lives,’ part of his point is that cultural practices, 
socially organized forms of human activity, are themselves often the proper object of 
philosophical understanding (rather than, say, abstract propositions or extra-cultural matters-of-
fact). Understanding typically requires more than that we possess the relevant concepts and 
representational capacities and that we can deploy them competently. It demands more than, as 
it were, definitional understanding. It requires a grasp of the role words and concepts play in 
constituting a ‘form of life.’10 Without this, in many cases understanding is merely conceptual and 
thus impoverished, incomplete. As such, it is a step short of that crucial grasp of the link between 
words, concepts, and the various forms of experience and circumstance in which we can fully see 
their significance, indeed what they ‘mean’ for creatures such as ourselves. In respect to a certain 
range of concepts, understanding is fully articulated only once it is contextualized, enlivened, and 
tethered to the rhythms and ticks of cultural life.11  
Works of narrative art should strike us as having an obvious role to play in this 
acculturation of understanding. It is, after all, in narrative form that we often represent actions 
and events, articulate the significance of experiences, and in general fashion a sense of how we 
hang together as persons, communities, and cultures. Add to this the claim that literary narratives 
provide us with many of our most complex and finely textured narratives, and the rudiments of 
an approach to the notion of literary knowledge becomes visible. I present these ideas in plainer 
philosophical terms below, but for the moment this will suffice to give a sense of my general 
orientation to the matter of how literary fictions can relate the mind to life.  
A word to the skeptic. One might claim that everything I have said applies to the 
significance of actual weaves of life and not to the fictional ones works of imaginative literature 
                                                        
9 I used this phrase in the title of a book (Gibson 2007) and it met with some confusion, since I did not reveal the 
source. I hope this discussion corrects that error.  
10 Wittgenstein (2009), 240. The German is ‘Muster auf dem Band des Lebens.  
11 I attempt to spell this out in proper philosophical terms in Gibson (2007).  
~5~ 
 
 
place before us. Literature, as the young Nietzsche thought, necessarily falsifies life, precisely 
because it adds so much ‘art’ to it.12  For Nietzsche it does so in a way that makes life bearable, 
since now presented as meaningful, beautiful, and significant, whereas in reality it is none of these 
things. Yet for just these reasons fictions cannot quite be said to show us the unadorned truth. 
The general worry this raises is obvious: the ordering of life one finds in a fictional narrative, and 
literature’s manner of investing life with great expressiveness and meaning, can seem to raise a 
powerful question as to whether literature is suitable for representing actual life at all. I will return 
to this idea.  
 
III Hamlet’s Problem  
Hamlet, we know, is ‘sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought;’ (III.i.84) he is ‘thought-sick.’ 
(III.iv.49) This is Hamlet’s problem: his predicament of thought and (in)action about which so 
much critical and philosophical hay has been made. Putting the problem this way makes it clear 
that I am concerned with the traditional question of why Hamlet hesitates; and while reducing 
his problem to one of ‘hesitation’ is perhaps crude, we know perfectly well what is being 
highlighted. It is, especially, the force of Hamlet’s self-questioning in his soliloquies as well as the 
text’s various references to the oppressiveness of the ‘sun,’ ‘ears’ as sites of penetration and 
potential contamination (by words, existence, other minds?), the expressions of disappointment 
with reason, language, and conscience, and, of course, sundry talk of skulls and suicide. 
‘Hesitation’ is a loose but serviceable way of referring to a series of problems and sites of potential 
significance in Hamlet that function as centers of interpretative gravity. I here elaborate one way 
of working through this familiar material so as to produce an example of how one might explain 
Hamlet’s problem. The hope is that my reading will illustrate how we can draw from a literary 
work something that seems a candidate for the sort of thing literary knowledge might be 
knowledge of.  
Sarah Beckwith argues that Shakespeare’s later ‘post-tragic’ plays develop a ‘grammar of 
forgiveness,’ and her claim provides an apt point of departure for my discussion. Plays such as 
Cymbeline and A Winter’s Take conclude with, in her words, ‘a public spectacle, event, or ceremony 
in which private fantasy, isolation, grief, self-immolation, or despair is overcome, and the 
protagonists return to what is common and shared as the ground of their relations and as a place 
where their expression of themselves can have a local habitation and a name.’13 In other words, 
the terrible event that crushes the protagonist at the end of a tragedy is, in Shakespeare’s post-
tragic plays, presented as a premise rather than a conclusion, and dramatic tension is generated 
by exploring the link that extends from this event to, if not redemption, then a revitalization of 
the self and its community (the two things tragedy always threatens to destroy). A helpful way of 
thinking about Hamlet is that it is a sustained study of life at the other end of the process, in the 
days before the terrible act, as the self attempts to comprehend its significance and to give order 
                                                        
12 This is the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy (2000). 
13 Beckwith (2011), 1. 
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to the various desires, anxieties, and doubts it has in respect to committing it. What is dramatized 
is the challenge of self-organization in the face of such an event: of our ability to arrange the 
moving parts of our psychological interior into a coherent self when called on to establish who we 
are through our actions. If forgiveness is what might be required in the aftermath of the act, prior 
to it the implicit plea is for something more akin to resolution, whose ‘native hue’ (III.i.83) 
Shakespeare depicts not as the simple matter of committing oneself to a course of action but as a 
deeper, moral-psychological issue of achieving determinacy as a thinking and feeling self.  
It is this resolution that defies Hamlet. There is something about the way Hamlet thinks 
that makes it so, and it is the particular manner in which his thinking appears to annihilate the 
possibility of both self-organization and action that presents the essential problem of 
understanding Hamlet. There are of course many literary characters whose motivational 
problems appear to raise, as Hamlet’s do, great existential and moral questions. It is hard not to 
think of Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener in this context. Like Hamlet, Bartleby refuses to act, though 
clearly on much different grounds. While Melville gives us virtually no access to the inner 
workings of his character’s mind, we at least know that Bartleby is possessed of a settled, and 
wholly negative, opinion on the value of action. We may not know why he thinks the world 
unworthy of his involvement; but his inaction reveals that he thinks this, since it is declared every 
time he says ‘I’d prefer not to.’ Thus Bartleby achieves the requisite resolution as an actor on the 
stage of life; it is just that he is convinced that the most suitable way of performing his role is by 
doing nothing. Hamlet, however, is amongst the most psychologically transparent characters 
literature has given us. He stands as a puzzle not because he fails to share his mind with the 
audience. Unlike Bartleby, Hamlet opens his mind to us entirely, and the problem is one of 
sorting through the mess inside. In this way Hamlet implies a rebuke to the old idea that what 
limits our knowledge of others is lack of access to their psychological interiors, as though if we 
could just look inside a person, our questions about who they really are and why they behave as 
they do would be fully answered. The play suggests that even if we could look in on Hamlet’s 
mind, what we would find there would be as vague and ambiguous as the self-image he offers the 
public world. This is because there is something essentially inchoate about Hamlet’s inner life, 
some crucial aspect that we expect to be defined yet that he insists on leaving unformed. Let me 
explain.  
For Hamlet thought propels one in precisely the wrong direction: back into the self rather 
than forward into the world. Hamlet does many things in the play, needless to say. But he does 
not do them as a coherent agent who is capable of self-legislated action: as one who wills himself 
to be thus and then steps out into the world according to plan. It is obviously a mistake to think 
that Hamlet retreats inward simply because he dislikes the options for action the world gives him, 
though he does dislike them: avenge his father and become a murderer, refuse the sin of murder 
and be a coward, or suicide, which God, he half-heartedly tells us, forbids. (I.ii.131). The murder 
of his father and remarriage of his mother to Claudius—all within the space of 7 or so weeks—
surely brought on his intense ‘melancholy,’ (II.ii.536; III.i.164), but we cannot imagine him to 
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have been a Laertes prior to all the bad news.14 As Hamlet thinks through his possibilities, we see 
the gradual emergence of a generalized dissatisfaction, felt to reach out to much more than 
Hamlet’s immediate predicament. Stating just what this generalized dissatisfaction is with is 
where the game becomes difficult. One has, in the broadest terms possible, two choices: (i) an 
externalist interpretation that sees Hamlet as articulating dissatisfaction with the world itself and 
the possibilities of experience it places before him; or (ii) an internalist interpretation that makes 
features of the self—of what it means to be minded—the essential object of dissatisfaction. 
Strictly speaking, these two interpretations are not incompatible (logically, that is; they may well 
be dramatically incompatible—a specific performance may have to choose between the two—
but that is another story). Nonetheless, each offers a very different way of articulating what Hamlet 
is, in a philosophical sense, about.  
I favor an internalist approach, certainly as a starting point, and it is in good part because 
of how I think a critic ought to unravel Hamlet’s claim that ‘there is nothing good or bad but 
thinking makes it so.’15 In the hands of ill-informed readers this can be taken in a resolutely 
externalist sense, as, say, suggesting constructivism or relativism about the moral realm. But this 
fails to do justice to our best hypothesis about Shakespeare’s intellectual inheritance and the way 
Hamlet amends a central aspect of it. As A. D. Nuttall observes, the line looks not forward to edgy 
postmodernists but back to detached Stoics, whose ideas would have dotted the material of an 
Elizabethan classical education. (Nuttall, 2007, 193) In this case the lines take on a new meaning. 
It is not a sage invocation of anti-realism but an attempt to make a despairing claim about the 
inescapability of the mind in experience.  
Note that for the Stoics, as for many Greek and Roman philosophers, passion is the part of 
the self that causes the gravest problems in the economy of the mind (‘soul’/ψυχή), though for the 
Stoics emotion cannot be neatly separated off from thought.16 Theirs was an essentially cognitive 
theory of emotion, according to which a passion is a complex psychological state with a judgment 
as its core. Passion, in effect, involves ‘thinking that makes it so,’ thereby presenting items in the 
world as disgusting, beloved, pitiable, and so on. But these are Stoics, and so emotions, certainly 
when intense, are seen as typically embodying false judgments about the value and significance of 
what befalls us (death as ‘mattering’ or ‘horrible’, things it is not in the grand scheme of things). 
                                                        
14 For discussion of the nature of social organization in Hamlet’s world and its relevance for understanding his 
afflictions, see Kottman (2009), Chapter 2. In Kottman’s reading, Hamlet is as much about our moral obligations to 
the dead and the confounding demands they place on us as it is about Hamlet’s ‘self.’  
15 This line appears in the F but not Q2—the basis of the Arden III edition used in this volume—or Q1. It appears 
in the Arden II edition (Harold Jenkins), which prefers but does not always privilege Q2, at II.ii.250.  
16 The Stoics, unlike Plato and Aristotle before them, clearly cannot explain akrasia as simply conflict between 
thought and passion, since the latter so essentially enlists the former. Nonetheless, they can distinguish between 
different ways in which different judgments can conflict, one, for example, that is rationally sanctioned and the 
other, embodied in a powerful emotion, that is not (my unshakable thought that another drink would make the 
evening better, even though I know, and rationally identify, with the judgment that it is best to be sober around 
colleagues). For a study of (early) Stoic moral psychology, see Brad Inwood (1984). For an excellent survey of the 
concept of akrasia in Greek philosophy, see Price (1995) and Nussbaum (1995).  For discussion of the Platonic roots 
of akrasia and the ‘tripartite soul,’ see the essays collected in Bobonich and Destrée (2007). 
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This is what the Stoics offer as a route to addressing a more basic, and familiar, problem, that of 
akrasia (‘weakness of the will’ or ‘moral incontinence’): the phenomenon of acting against our best 
judgment. In Plato’s foundational image, reason, a charioteer, holds the reins of the unruly 
horses of passion and appetite, and in akrasia one of the beasts pulls free, usually commandeering 
reason and so directing thought in the process. The upshot of all this is that on the classical 
model of mind a coherent self is one in which the passions we act on and the desires we satisfy 
are those that logos consecrates, in effect, as mine: as expressive of my values, my beliefs, my goals. 
In akratic behavior a mere (e.g.) desire gets expressed (for that cigarette; for another hour at the 
bar) but not quite a person. The failure of self-organization in akratic action implies a failure of 
self-expression: my behavior does not speak for who I take myself to be. When suffering akrasia, 
how I believe I hang together as a person is defied by, rather than declared through, my actions. 
What makes Hamlet so fascinating to a reader concerned with the self and moral 
psychology is that in his figure reason alone, not passion or desire, comes to seem the culprit in 
the fits and paroxysms of the akratic mind.17 In Hamlet logos just produces logorrhea, expelling 
an endless stream of ‘words, words, words.’ If reason is not right with the world, it is not due to 
an epistemic failure or the deceptions of passion but to the endless addition of another word 
when trying to render judgment. Yet the intimacy of reason, thinking and the self yields a larger 
problem. As a phenomenologist might put it, the self is always in the ‘dative’ position of 
experience, endowing it with an inescapable ‘for-me-ness.’ (Zahavi, 2011, 326-327). It is 
omnipresent in conscious thought, and this is what Hamlet cannot tolerate: consciousness takes 
the form of ‘a prison.’18 He suffers the inevitable presence of the self as the rest of us experience 
white noise, a kind of buzzing of me-ness that makes him yearn for ‘quietus.’ (III.i.74) This 
quietus, death, strikes Hamlet as a viable avenue of self-escape, until thought, of course, keeps on 
going and asks ‘what dreams may come//When we have shuffled off this mortal coil.’ (III.i.66) 
Thought effectively poisons Hamlet’s hope that there is at least one place where he can escape 
the chatter of ‘conscience.’ If this is so, then when Hamlet says ‘thus conscience does make 
cowards,’ (III.i.82) he laments not quite his failure of agency but the limitlessness of thought and 
its endless generation of—to borrow Gertrude’s line—‘noise so rude.’ (iii.iv.39) The problem of 
Hamlet is not inaction but hyperactivity, just reinterpreted in psychological rather than 
behavioral terms.  
The text’s various references to the ears now take on a distinct significance. As Tzachi 
Zamir notes, ‘for Shakespeare’s contemporaries…[w]hatever enters the ear is conceived as a 
powerful, and at times violent, entity, capable of transforming the hearer.’ (Zamir, 2006, 168-9) 
In Hamlet this violence is given a very particular spin. The sense modality through which the 
thought of others is most commonly received is of course auditory, by way of spoken language 
(perhaps the internet has rendered this false; it was certainly true in Hamlet’s world). This is what 
                                                        
17 This is also what makes Hamlet seem so prescient in respect to various modern critiques of rationalist views of the 
human. 
18 This is the continuation of II.ii.250 in F, and while it refers to Denmark, the passage treats it as a synecdoche for a 
much wider landscape. 
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logos traffics in, semantically packaged ‘accounts’: descriptions, explanations, and theories. For 
Hamlet this openness to other minds compounds the problem exponentially. The ears add to the 
noise inside the noise of others, turning what would be the solitary mumbling of one mind into a 
grating choir. Each of these voices adds one more statement of how the world and its affairs 
‘seem’ to it. In Hamlet there are some 166 mentions of ‘seems’ and 182 of ‘appears.’ The 
repetition reinforces the sense of the self as assaulted from within and from without by thought 
and the relentlessness of its manner of making things ‘appear’ and ‘seem.’ Or so Hamlet feels. 
‘Seeming’ is also a mark of determinacy, of something achieving sufficient form to appear 
as this or that. Hamlet, as nearly every critic notes, is marked by a refusal of self-definition. He 
feels ‘too much in the sun,’ (i.ii.67) and his wish is to ‘resolve into a kind a dew,’ (I.ii.130) that is, a 
liquescent, unformed, state.19 When he tells Gertrude ‘I know not seems,’ (I.ii 76), we initially 
hear his refusal to put on appearances as a claim to authenticity, though as the play progresses we 
gradually come to realize that his use of ‘seems’ has a subtler meaning. In the semantic and 
symbolic play of the language of Hamlet, ‘being’ is associated with ‘the sun’ and ‘seeming’, that is, 
with the illuminated world in which things appear as the things they presumably are. Hamlet is 
not, we know, quite at home in this world. He copes with it in part by dissociating his sense of self 
from those aspects of a person in which we habitually think self-identity resides. One way of 
stating this difficult idea is in terms of a fairly precise refusal of self-constitution. A central way in 
which we articulate a sense of self—an image of being a particular kind of person—is through an 
act of psychological identification. We all have perhaps an anarchy of different desires, emotions, 
beliefs, interests, and concerns that pass through us, if not in a single moment then certainly over 
a span of time. As we saw hinted in the discussion of akrasia, the road to self-constitution is paved 
in part by identifying with certain of these desires (etc.), bestowing upon them the right to stand for 
us, that is, to be expressive of who we take ourselves to be.20 Now I might be guilty of self-flattery 
or self-deception when I identify with my desire for a modest life or my love of animals, but in so 
identifying I begin to craft a self-image. I can now ‘appear’ as a kind of person, to myself and, if I 
wish, to others. In fact, it now becomes possible to ask questions of self-knowledge: am I really as I 
take myself to be, and are those features of my mental life I tap as essentially expressive of me 
those which actually inform my agency? This is what Hamlet understands, and it is in effect this 
kind of self-identification against which he rebels. His problems of agency bear witness to an 
unwillingness to let various of our desires, wishes, beliefs to speak for us, indeed to give domicile to 
our identity. Of course throughout the play Hamlet desires various things, expresses values, 
                                                        
19 In the Hegelian tradition of interpretation, this craving for indeterminacy is linked both to a kind of angst (with 
existence and the pressures it places on us), and a desire for the freedom of pure potentiality. On this, see Kristin 
Gjesdal’s ‘Reading Shakespeare - Reading Modernity.’ (2005) 
20 This way of thinking about the self comes into the philosophical literature by way of Harry Frankfurt’s still highly 
influential theory of identification, according to which selves have (second-order) volitions regarding which (first-
order) desires constitute our self-concept as agents (our ‘will’). See Frankfurt (1988). This line of thought can also be 
developed in terms of so-called narrative conceptions of the self, in which case the important act of identification 
will not, or not just, be with desires but, crucially, with the events and experiences that provide the content of the 
stories we tell of ourselves and the lives we lead. See Marya Schechtman (2014) for an excellent defense of this.  
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endorses thoughts, and states preference for actions. The point, however, is that Hamlet lets none 
of them declare his identity. None of them functions to constitute a self. 
To distill these reflections on Hamlet’s problem into a philosophical point, I conclude 
with two related claims. The first, clearly, is that Hamlet inherits and amends in a novel manner 
the traditional picture of akrasia. Hamlet is perhaps the first cognitive akratic, that is, the text 
renders intelligible an image of human moral psychology in which a cognitive state—thought, 
bluntly put—alone can make self-organization impossible in the face of action. In Hamlet logos 
does not hold the reins but itself is one of the beasts, and this raises a fascinating question about 
just what, and where, the self is for Hamlet and in Hamlet. Hamlet effectively dislodges his sense 
of self from any of the features of the mind traditionally imagined to be capable of housing it: not 
just desire and passion but even thought itself.21 There would seem nowhere to go from here, no 
further feature of the psyche to make expressive of his self through a grand act of identification. 
But the play indicates a striking possibility.  
To bring this possibility to view, we must first note that it is a mistake to think, as critics 
sometimes do, that Hamlet pushes the self deeper into the psychological interior, hiding it more 
thoroughly from the public world than classical models of mind could countenance. Hamlet’s self 
is marked by radical abstraction and not interiority or innerness.22 It is the image of a self, dim and 
merely implied, as what remains when I say I am not this. As Hamlet wishes, it is formless, ‘dew-
like,’ removed from ‘the sun,’ and thus a self largely without defining qualities. But herein lies the 
accomplishment: showing that one can generate, and identify with, a voice that functions only to 
express alienation from all that would otherwise make self-constitution possible: desires, thoughts, 
actions—the whole lot of it. This is of course a profoundly estranged self-image, and that is the 
point. Nietzsche calls it the ‘pathos of distance,’ which is achieved through ‘out-looking and 
down-looking’ on those we deem beneath us.23 For Hamlet it just happens that the objects of this 
pathos are internalized, not other people but all those features of ourselves upon which we can 
                                                        
21 For elegance of argument, if it can be called that, I ignore a possibility. I have approached moral psychology with 
the classical picture of the tripartite self and claimed that Hamlet breaks its mold. But the tri-partite picture of the 
self was effectively expanded by Augustine and later medieval moral psychology, and the amendment would have 
been very familiar to any Elizabethan who entered a church. It is the addition of a forth element, the will (voluntas). 
There is perhaps an element of this in Hamlet, namely, that Hamlet effectively houses his identify in something will-
like. In a sense, the will is just the voice of agency, the part of the person that makes pronouncements of identity with 
various desires, beliefs, and values. Nonetheless, Hamlet still can be said to revise the traditional view of even this 
picture, since the will is now conceived as generating an entirely negative voice, not as constituting agency through 
acts of psychological identification but in the refusal to do so.  
22 On the idea of inwardness, interiority, innerness, and the like, see Ferry (1983), Maus (1995), Greenblatt (2001), 
Tilmouth (2007), and Zamir (2008). 
23 Nietzsche (1917), 197. Parts of the passage in which this phrase would seem to offer much more for making sense 
of  Hamlet: ‘Without the pathos of distance, such as grows out of the incarnated difference of classes, out of the 
constant out-looking and down-looking of the ruling caste on subordinates and instruments, and out of their 
equally constant practice of obeying and commanding, of keeping down and keeping at a distance—that other 
more mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul 
itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short, just the 
elevation of the type ‘man,’ the continued ‘self-surmounting of man,’ to use a moral formula in a supermoral 
sense.’  
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hang a determinate self-concept. Whatever we may think of the desirability of this self, the text 
pulls off an impressive philosophical trick: it reveals that self-constitution can consist in acts of 
self-alienation and refusals of self-expression (in the sense given here), and it shows that, despite 
appearances, there is nothing really contradictory about the idea. Hamlet is of course happy to 
accept the consequence of this: that it makes of the self an ‘airy nothing,’24 a fiction not unlike the 
characters on the stage in his try at theater in Act 3. But this fiction, this air of a self that is 
brought to view only obliquely, is, for all that, an image of a self: of one whose particular way of 
being consists in not being one way or another. There is nothing to know about this self, it has 
virtually no determinacy, except, of course, the determinacy of a refusal. Yet it has a voice—a 
decisively negative one—and it can be heard, indeed even enacted on the stage, and it is thus a 
proper object of dramatic and philosophical appreciation.  
 
IV The Matter of Meaning 
We can now return to the question with which we began. We have a candidate insight, into 
selfhood, as my interpretation has it. And so we have something that seems a potential object of 
understanding, perhaps even an example of the sort of thing literary knowledge might be 
knowledge of. To make a first pass at this, assume for a moment the aptness of my interpretation, 
just to see what follows from it. 
 Note that what my interpretation has yielded is the very thing that a common line of 
thought tells will not do if we wish to assert literature’s philosophical and cognitive value. What I 
have drawn from Hamlet is just an image: a vision, fictional at that, of a person burdened with a 
peculiar sense of self. And a certain kind of philosopher will complain that images, pictures, 
visions and the like merely represent a state of affairs; they do not establish its truth.25 Something 
must be done with an image if it is to lead the mind to truth and knowledge, some surrounding 
apparatus of argumentation must be provided, some reason must be proffered for believing that it 
gets things right; hence the desire for propositions and proofs mentioned in Section II. The 
worry, with us since Plato, is that literature’s manner of ‘showing’ is mimetic and not epistemic. Art 
presents a picture but demonstrates nothing about it, that is, it does not show the picture to be 
reasonable, right, accurate, revelatory of reality: anything that could give the image a claim to 
cognitive significance. And my interpretation of Hamlet appears to walk us directly into this 
thicket of worry. It is worth adding that the picture of the self Hamlet inherits and amends is, it 
turns out, likely false: modern sciences of the mind do not countenance the existence of tripartite 
psyches or a thing called ‘logos.’ So how could Hamlet lead the mind to something called insight, 
to something one might know? 
                                                        
24  A Midsummer Night’s Dream (IV.i.16). 
25 What I canvass here are often described as arguments for aesthetic anti-cognitivism, that is, the idea that art, 
literature included, derives none of its value from its contributions to human understanding and the growth of 
knowledge. See Stolnitz (1992) and Diffey (1995) for classic anti-cognitivist arguments.   
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 The above line of reasoning is too quick and too manifestly philosophical in respect to the 
terms it offers us for addressing the issue. First things first, Hamlet in fact does demonstrate 
something. It even shows something to be the case; it establishes something. It may not be the truth 
of a proposition about what selves—all or most of them—in fact are. Nor is it quite a conclusion 
about the nature of self-experience. But for all that something is still made very clear. Hamlet 
demonstrates the intelligibility rather than the truth of a certain view of the self. The play makes 
comprehensible a way of thinking about mindedness and the inescapable presence of the self as a 
problem, as a ‘prison.’ It turns into an object of understanding how anxieties, fears, and material 
circumstances may conspire to make such an abstracted self desirable, even appear a sanctuary. 
Truth is important, but so is what Hamlet gives us: a refinement of thought, and an enlargement 
of our sense of the possibilities and complexities of experience. When I assert this, it is important 
to see that I am not reporting on something that I simply feel has happened to me when reading 
Hamlet, describing, as it were, the private glow of personal illumination. There may be some of 
that, but what bears primary witness to this refinement of understanding is the refinement of 
terms, concepts, distinctions, and habits of thinking about selves displayed in the work of criticism: in 
the struggle, public in nature, to state what one finds of significance in Hamlet. If one does not 
think that this is in evidence in my interpretation, it will be if one begins to work through the 
history of Hamlet criticism and its brighter achievements.  
This form of demonstration is narratological and perhaps not in any interesting sense 
epistemic. A narrative demonstration aims not at establishing the truth of some matter but rather 
at showing that a coherent story can be told of it. It demonstrates, for instance, that a view of the 
self as formless, estranged, and abstracted can be given sense in the context of a kind of life. The 
story makes this view of the self meaningful, not, of course, by tracing the boundaries of a 
concept and defining it in propositional terms, but by showing us what it amounts to as a kind of 
human experience, as a way, that is, one might be in the world. Thus while it is fair to say that 
Hamlet demonstrates the intelligibility of a certain conception of the self, it is not a merely 
conceptual mode of presentation. It presents the ‘idea’ of this self as embodied, placed on the 
concrete stage of human action and relationship. The concept is given flesh, indeed Hamlet’s 
“too sallied flesh” (I.ii.129), and so it becomes intelligible to us as a precisely shaped human 
situation. Literary works, because of their way with fictional narratives, can infuse understanding 
with a sense of what a certain slice of life looks like when configured in the light of the concepts 
and ‘ideas’ upon which we habitually rely: despair, joy, alienation, or weakness of the will as these 
‘patterns in the weave of our lives.’ It is essentially our understanding of this that I am claiming 
literature refines, expands, and enlivens. Fictions, for reasons entirely too obvious to be worth 
mentioning, give us infinitely more opportunities than the actual world does for providing these 
slices of life.  
Noël Carroll argues that literary narratives are primarily concerned not with the 
discovery of new items of knowledge but the clarification of our existing (moral) concepts and the 
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demands they place on us.26 My claim is kindred, at least to the extent that it takes the 
achievement of a kind of clarity to be paramount. It is literature’s ability, as exemplified by 
Hamlet, to link thought to context, concepts to visions of lived experience, ‘ideas’ to cultural 
conditions, that explains its particular gift to the mind: its ‘cognitive significance.’. This 
acculturation of understanding is what I am claiming to be literature chief’s contribution to 
understanding: its ability, on occasion at least, to bring the contents of our minds more perfectly 
in line with the ‘form of life,’ to misuse Wittgenstein’s phrase just slightly. This is, I submit, a fair 
answer to the question of what literature knows and so of what literary knowledge might be 
knowledge of. It is in effect a form of know-how: knowledge of how to use fictions, and the 
narratives that deliver them to us, to bring thought more firmly in line with the material of life: 
with practices, experiences, relationships, desires, and everything else that bears the mark of the 
world we are inclined to call ours. True, Hamlet is not real, but only a terribly misguided 
metaphysical view would lead us to conclude that his world is therefore not the human one. 
Fictional characters and real people are not of a piece, but the practices in which they engage, 
the relationships they cultivate, and the anxieties that animate them provide the needed 
undercurrent of shared life, a common stage upon which our ontological differences become 
visible yet appear to be much less of a big deal. Not every literary work, of course, establishes this 
shared stage, and some get us wholly wrong. But the terms in which I explicated Hamlet provide 
an example of how we speak when we wish to affirm success. 
It is in this way that we can see how to handle the skeptic when she protests, ‘Hamlet does 
not exist, and thus the play only demonstrates that a certain view of the self applies to a fiction, 
not to us!’ If Hamlet does not establish the truth of a certain view, it by extension does not 
establish that it is true of any one of us. In other words, it does not attempt to say that this is how 
we, or even how some of us, are. To this extent, Nietzsche is vindicated. But the achievement of 
Hamlet is more fundamental than can be captured in these terms, and it enjoys a certain priority 
to matters of truth. The point is simple. Before we can query the truth of various ways of taking 
ourselves and our world to be, we must first have the vision itself. That is, what renders talk of 
truth and falsity meaningful is a more basic cultural accomplishment: the production of these 
visions of life and the fleshing out of a sense of the world and the possibilities of experience it 
contains. What Hamlet gives us in respect to the self is more akin to a moment of genesis than the 
discovery of a fact: the establishment of an image, in the form of Hamlet himself, that holds in 
place a cluster of concerns about self-organization, thought, and action. This is one way of 
explaining why Hamlet provides the framework for so many philosophical, psychoanalytic, 
theological and existential analyses of the person. Hamlet creates the terms for the debate and so a 
ground on which it can be carried out. By rendering intelligible such a view of the self, Hamlet 
offers a refinement of our capacity to think about what it means to be minded and the burden of 
self-experience this can place on us, at least on those of us whose ‘melancholy’ makes such a self 
seem desirable. The compliment to be paid to this is not to call it ‘true’ but ‘foundational’: it is 
                                                        
26 See Carroll (1998). His position is aptly labeled ‘clarificationism.’ I resist the temptation to refer to my position as 
‘acculturationism.’ 
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the establishment of grounds for a manner of thinking about persons and their plights. That these 
grounds have proven productive and valuable is brought to relief not by, or just by, looking 
inside the work; we see it most asserted clearly in all the theories, arguments, and artworks built 
upon it in the 400 years since its first performance.  
 
Before concluding I have to address a final item of business. What happens if we no longer 
assume the aptness of my interpretation? What happens, that is, if we look out across the vast 
expanse of skeptical, theological, psychoanalytic (and so on) interpretations? Does everything I 
have just argued for suddenly become provisional, at least until I can refute all competing 
interpretations? Does the assertion of my interpretation commit me to the painfully conservative 
view that all other interpretations are illegitimate just to the extent they conflict with mine? I trust 
it does not, and while these questions open up all those great debates on the nature of 
interpretation—debates I clearly do not have the space to address here—I want to say why I 
think it would be an error to think that they vitiate the points I am putting on offer here.  
The mistake, I think, is to think that conflicting interpretations necessarily assign 
conflicting content to a literary work. We can be inclined to think this when held captive by a bad 
picture of what content is in a literary context. The picture can be put a number of ways, though 
one way is to cast it in terms of a mistaken view of the relationship between text and meaning. It 
is to model our thinking of how literary works bear meaning on our model of how sentences do. 
As a sentence is a vehicle of a proposition, a text, on this picture, is a vehicle of a meaning. And 
as a proposition just is the content of a sentence, a meaning just is the content of a text.  Thus my 
reading falsifies the very content of Hamlet if it turns out that the play is not really about 
selfhood—that it does not contain this meaning—or at any rate not about it in the manner I have 
claimed. But a literary work is very unlike a sentence. There are many reasons for this, but I trust 
a few simple examples will suffice. Consider the difference, radical indeed, between the meaning 
of ‘meaning’ in these cases: 
 
1. What is the meaning of the Gullah sentence, ‘A ain shame eben one leetle bit ob 
de Good Nyews’?27   
2. What do the recent attacks on Paris mean?  
 
And, more colloquially, 
 
3. Exactly what were you reporting when you confessed that you threatened a man 
with a severed limb?  
                                                        
27 It is a line from the Gullah New Testament and can be translated as, “For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of 
Christ.” 
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4. Just what does the Trump campaign say about us?  
 
In cases 1 and 3 we are asking about the semantic meaning of a linguistic vehicle, and our 
knowledge of communicative intentions gives us very good reason to assume that they each 
attempt to generate one and only one content (if not, then the sentences are ill-formed or not a 
genuine attempt to convey a content). In cases 2 and 4, however, we are talking about culture and 
not assertions, events and not linguistic vehicles. We might find conflicting Marxist, libertarian, or 
Seventh-Day Adventist interpretations of 2 and 4, but clearly here the conflict is between the 
values, concerns, and philosophical commitments different interpreters endorse. The ‘content’ of 
these examples, like the content of a narrative, is a constellation of events, sayings, doings, and 
happenings, delivered to us through language but not themselves linguistic in nature (an attack 
on a city is not a sentence). In disagreeing in our interpretations, we call into question the terms 
we each deem appropriate for capturing the significance of these events, their ‘meaning’ in an 
broadly ‘existential’ sense. Still, each interpretation takes itself to be attempting to specify the 
nature of these events: of what they are about and so of what they mean. If I call a certain act or 
practice violent, I take myself be saying something about its nature, about it the way that it is. 
Only a profound act of dissociation, or self-doubt, would permit me to experience the violence I 
see in a blow as a mere projection, a reflection of my attitudes but not also of the character of the 
event.  
It is at this juncture that we do well to think of Hamlet in its natural state, as a play, and to 
recall that literary works in general, though offering us a texture of words, function to bring 
before us the texture of a world: an image of a weave of life. When we ask what bears meaning, it 
is in the primary instance the configuration of life we might find on the stage or page. The 
‘content’ of this just is the actions, sayings, sufferings, and predicaments enacted before us. My 
interpretation, and most others that are philosophical in nature, are attempts to put to words the 
significance of life so configured. It is the attempt to find terms appropriate for revealing why this 
weave of fictional life suggests to us something of consequence about, if not exactly ourselves, 
then certainly selves and their complexity. It is the intricacy of the ‘form of life’ we find in it that 
underwrites the variety and openness of manners in which we can, with apparent legitimately, 
specify what it means. An externalist interpretation that casts Hamlet as suffering from a 
disappointment in the world surely is in disagreement with an internalist one that casts him as 
disappointed with the self. Assuming neither of us has simply misperceived or misheard what is 
happening on the stage, then the conflict is ultimately between how we are inclined to make 
sense of life, not the ‘content’ of Hamlet. We may of course disagree about the (semantic) meaning 
of various utterances in Hamlet, form varying hypothesis about the intentions of its author, 
discover that we mistook a historical reference, and much else besides. And this may lead us to a 
different sense of something rightly called the content of the play. These problems are perhaps 
inescapable in the interpretation of art, and I have no wish to deny this. My point, however, is 
that when the articulation of meaning is performed in the register outlined here, we are engaged 
in an activity different in nature than when we argue about whether Hamlet’s flesh is “sullied”, 
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“sallied” or “solid” (I.ii.29) and its broader implications for the meanings we find in the play. In 
this respect, if Hamlet stands as one of the most powerful examples we have of a work that seems 
constitutionally open to varying interpretations, understanding why this is so should lead us to 
begin the good work of liberating the notion of “literary meaning” from the concept of linguistic 
meaning. Hamlet is work made of words, but those words function to lead us to a picture of a 
person and his plight. And it defies us not quite because its signification it a challenge to pin 
down but rather because its significance strikes us as so potentially vast, perhaps even ‘unlimited.’ 
It is a work that seems to implicate us, in our very act of attempting to make sense of it, in the act 
of working through, and so making meaningful, basic features of our ethical, familial, existential, 
and psychological condition. All these features of “life” are, of course, constitutionally open to 
interpretation and reinterpretation, not because we do not know what they “mean” but rather 
because their meanings—their sense, import, and significance—are    
 
 V CONCLUSION 
All this leads us round to a simple point. It is hardly surprising, though certain trends in 
philosophy and literary theory have done their part to make such a mundane observation worthy 
of statement. It is just this: what Hamlet offers as an object of understanding is Hamlet. This, and 
not some further thing, is what it makes available to the mind as an object of cognitive attention. 
It is what it possesses that is worth knowing, at least if we wish to acquire knowledge of the 
complexity of our culture’s concerns with the self and the varieties of ways it imagines it.  
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